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PROSPECTIVE DAMAGES TO REALTY-SUCCESSIVE
ACTIONS OR SINGLE ACTION.
QUESTION STATED.-The question when a man may recover
compensation for damages which he has not suffered, but is likely
to suffer by reason of the acts of another, is one of considerable
nicety. The question has a special importance with reference to
damages to realty, likely to be caused by the construction of rail-
ways or public works.
So far as the present discussion relates to public works it does
not directly deal with the right to compensation for incidental dam-
ages, but is limited to the measure of damages and time of recovery.
Unnecessary damages, caused by negligent and unskilful con-
struction of public works present an important phase of the question,
and it is illustrated generally by the whole range of torts to realty
springing from causes operating from adjacent realty.
In the recent cases of the Chicago & -Eastern Illinois Bd. v. Loeb,
8 N. E. R. 460; and Baldwin v. Ohicago, Milwaukee . St. Paul
Rd., 29 N. W. R. 5, the rule is adopted that the damages, present
and prospective, must all be recovered in one action. In Uline v.
NYew York Central . .Hudson River Rd., 4 N. E. R. 536, 23 A.
& E. Rd. Cases 3, the opposite rule, viz. : Of successive actions for
damages up to the date of bringing suit is enunciated in an opinion
of great force, but in the same case DANFORTH, J., filed a vigor-
ous dissenting opinion.
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GENERAL RULE OF LAw.-The general rule as to prospective
damages as stated by Mr. Mayne, is, that damages arising subsequent
to action brought, or even to the date of the verdict, may be taken
into consideration, when they are the natural and necessary result
of the act complained of and do not themselves constitute a new
cause of action: Mayne's Law of Damages (3d ed.) 84.
This rule is clearly correct upon principle and is plainly dedu-
cible from the decisions. The difficulty is in the application.
Without attempting to harmonize all the cases, I shall endeavor
to indicate the principles which I believe are recognised by the
greater weight of authority, and which if fairly applied would remove
most of the confusion from the decisions. The plain distinction
of fact between cases of trespass and cases of no trespass has been
overlooked in most of the decisions. It has been assumed that the
time of recovery and measure of damages would be the same in
both, and trespass cases have been cited as authorities in actions for
nuisances, and vice versa. Again, the fact that a tort beginning with
a trespass has created a continuing nuisance, has frequently been
overlooked.
In such a case the question to be decided in order to determine
what rule of damages shall apply is, in what class of torts shall it
be placed ? Shall it be treated as a trespass or as a continuing
nuisance ? It has the features of both-to which class shall it be
assigned ?
In brief, the rule as to prospective damages does not lead to the
same result in all cases of torts to realty ; but there are classes of
torts to realty upon which the foregoing rule operates variously and
in applying the rule the first thing to do is to classify the tort.
CLASSIFICATION OF TORTS TO REALTY.-For the sake of clear-
ness I summarize here the classification of these torts, with the rules
of damages therefor, into which I believe the mass of the decisions
will actually fall, thus:
I. Single Nuisances and Acts Wrongful only when Causing Actual
Damage.
Rule of Damages-Damages computed to Date of Beginning
Action.
II. Continuing Nuisances.
Rule of Damages-Successive Actions with Recovery to Date of
Beginning Action.
III. Trespasses.
Rule of Damages-One Aetion for all Damages, Past, Present
and Prospective.
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IV. Trespasses Causing Continuing Nuisances.
Rule of Damages--Successive Actions with Recovery to Date of
Beginning Action.
V. Permanent Injuries for Torts to Realty other than Trespasses.
Rule of Damages-One Action for all Damages, Past, Present
and Prospective.
There is no inherent reason why the rule as to prospective dam-
ages should produce the same results when applied to cases differing
so widely in their facts as those in these five classes, and nothing is
more certain than that the rule as applied by the courts has not
operated with uniform result. But the natural diversity in result
has, I believe, been greatly increased and confused by an ignoring
of the fundamental differences in the classes-and the greatest suc-
cess in harmonizing the decisions has been secured by observing the
differences between these classes.
I. SINGLE NUISANCES AND ACTS WRONGFUL ONLY WHEN CAUS-
ING ACTUAL DAMAGE.-In cases falling within this class, i. e., where
the gravamen of the action is the damage inflicted, the recovery is
limited to such damages as have accrued prior to the date of beginning
the action, and any subsequent damage must be recovered in a sepa-
rate action when it has in fact accrued: Robinsonv. Bland, per MYTANS-
FIELD, Ld. 0. J., 2 Burr. 1077; Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 10 0. B. N. S.
765; NiNcklin v. Williams, 10 Ex. 259; Bonomi v. Backhouse, E., B.
& E. 622; s. c. 9 H. L. 0. 503; Bosewell v. Prior, 2 Salk. 460;
Battishill v. Reed, 18 0. B. 696; Bankart v. Houghton, 28 L. J.
Oh. 473; Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389 (dissenting opinion of
COCKBURN, 0. J.); Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Co., 14 Q.B.
Div. 125; 24 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 432, overruling Lamb v. Walker,
supra, and adopting COCKBURN'S dissenting opinion; Del. & Bar-
itan Canal Co. v. Wright, 21 N. J. L. 469; Waggoner. v. Jer-
maine, 3 Denio 306 ; Baldwin v. Calkins, 10 Wend. 167, 179;
Phillips v.' Terry, 3 Keyes 313 ; Whitemore v. Bisehoff, 5 Hun
176; Duryea v. Mayor, 26 Id. 120; Beekwith v. Griswold, 29
Barb. 291 ; Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio 489 ; Polly v. Mc Call, 1
Ala. Sel. Cas. 246; s. c. 37 Ala. 20; Stein v. Burden, 24 Id.
130; Savannah Canal Co. v. Bourquin, 51 Ga. 378; Shaw v.
Etheridge, 3 Jones (N. 0.) 300; Burnett v. Nicholson, 86 N. 0.
99; Duncan v. Markley, 1 Harper (S. C.) 276; Langford v. Ows-
ley, 2 Bibb (Ky.) 215; Cobb v. Smith, 88 Wis. 21; Hazletine v.
Case, 46 Id. 391; Clark v. Nevada Mining Co., 6 Nev.,203;
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Jodges v. Hodges, 5 Mete. 205; M~onnel v. Kibbe, 29 Ill. 483;
He( onnel v. Kibbe (second action: opinion per BECiKWITH, J.), 33
Id. 175.
In Whitehouse v. Pellowes, 10 0. B. N. S. 765, the trustees of
a pike road had covered over an open ditch at the side of their road,
and converted it into an enclosed drain. In times of freshet and
heavy rains this drain proved insufficient to carry away the water,
and so caused it to overflow plaintiff's lands. WILLIAMS, J., said:
" In considering the first point I assume that an injurious act was
done to the plaintiff, by reason of the defendant's improper man-
agement of the catch-pits, whereby the water which ought to have
passed down the drain was caused to flow into the plaintiffs pits.
The question is whether the plaintiff is bound to rest his complaint
upon the original construction of the works, or whether he can
maintain an action after the expiration of three months from that
time (which was the period of the special statute of limitation ap-
plicable thereto). "I am of opinion that the continuance by the
defendant of that negligent and improper condition of the road
under their charge, if accompanied by fresh damage to the plain-
tiff, constitutes a fresh cause of action." "Suppose an action to
have been commenced immediately after the first injury accrued
to the plaintiff's pits from the flow of water down the road in ques-
tion ; when that cause came to be tried, the only question would be
how much damage the plaintiff had actually sustained. It would
be monstrous injustice to hold that the jury must assume that the
defendants would persevere in their wrongful conduct, and that the
damages must be assessed upon that assumption. All that the jury
could do would be to find what damages the plaintiff had sustained
from the wrongful act complained of, and they would be told to give
him such damages as they might find he had sustained, down to the
time of the commencement of the action."
In Lamb v. Walker, 3 Q. B. Div. 389, which was a case of ex-
cavation upon his own land, in consequence of which there was a
subsidence of plaintiff's land and damage done to his building by
the loss of support, and a further subsidence seemed to impend.
CocKBumN, in his dissenting opinion, said: "The fundamental prin-
ciple on which the decision in Baekhouse v. Bonomi, proceeds is,
that no cause of action arises in respect of what a man does on his
own land, until actual damage arises therefrom to the property of
the adjoining owner. According to that decision, there is no
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abstract right of support independent of acquired easement, from
adjacent strata, and the removal of such strata constitutes in itself
no wrong. No wrong arises to A. from the excavation of B., on
his own soil, though the stability of A.'s adjoining land may be
thereby endangered, unless and until A. sustains actual damage
therefrom." And he quotes WILLES, J.'s opinion in that case:
"The law favors the right of dominion by every one upon his own
land and his using it for the most beneficial purpose to himself."
He insists at some length upon the ability of the defendant to sup-
ply artificial support and thereby prevent any further subsidence
and further damage. This is in reality the affirmation that the
condition of affairs after the first subsidence is temporary and may
be changed, which is the same consideraton which is brought for-
ward by WILLIAMS, J., in Whitehouse v. F ellowes. After speaking
of the difficulty of determining future damages, he concludes:
"Moreover this inconvenience would be seriously aggravated by
the fact that whenever appreciable damage had resulted, however
limited its extent, a plaintiff would be compelled not only to bring
his action, though he might think the damage not sufficient to make
it worth while to enter into litigation, but also to go into the whole
question of speculative future damage, lest he should be barred by
the Statute of Limitations in respect of future damage, however
serious, which might accrue after the expiration of the statutory
period."
This reasoning is adopted and the opinion of the majority over-
ruled in Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Co., 14 Q. B. Div. 125,
24 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 432, and BRETT, M. R., and BOWEN and
FRY, LL.JJ., repeat and reinforce these distinctions in extended
opinions.
This rule limiting the damages from an act wrongful only by
reason of damages, to the damages accrued when suit was brought,
applies to cases where the acts causing the damages complained of
are interrupted and repeated, where temporary flash boards are
erected on a dam from time to time, or damages are caused by the
occasional opening of the gates of a dam: Noyes v. Stillman, 24
Conn. 15, and to cases where from one act not wrongful ia itself
successive damages are caused at different times, as in the excavation
cases, supra; or where, by erecting a temporary obstruction in a
stream, water is from time to time diverted from the riparian
owner below. Beekwith v. Griswold, 29 Barb. 291.
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IL CONTINUING KUISAMCES.-flere the rule is familiar that
every continuance of a nuisance is a new nuisance, for which a fresh
action is maintainable; and it is the simplest application of the gen-
eral rule as to prospective damages that they are not recoverable in
such cases. The recovery in each action is limited to damages accrued
prior to the date of the action: Beswick v. Combdon, T. Moore
853 ; Cro. Eiz. 402 ; Penruddock's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 205 ; 3 Bl.
Com. 220; Rosewell v. Prior, 2 Salk. 460; Tay v. Prentice, 1
C. B. 828 ; Bowyer v. Cook, 4 Id. 236; -Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Ad.
& El. 503; Thompson v. Gibson, 7 i. & W. 456; McConnell v.
.Kibbe, 29 Ill. 482; Same v. Same, second action, 33 Id. 175 ;
Staple v. Spring, 10 Mass. 72; Hodges v. Hodges, 5 Met. 205;
Baldwin v. Calkins, 10 Wend. 167; Beidelman v. .Poulk, 5
Watts 308 ; Blunt v. Meormick, 3 Denio 283 ; Cumberland, se.,
Corp. v. Bitchings, 65 Me. v. 140; Thayer Brooks, 17 Ohio 489;
Beach v. Crain, 2 N. Y. 86; 1 Sutherland, Damages 202 ; Gould
on Waters, sect. 387.
As was said by BECKWITH, J., in keConnell v. Kibbe, 33 Ill.
175, " Successive suits for actual damages may be brought from
time to time as the damages are sustained, and in each suit the party
may recover such damages as he has sustained prior to its commence-
ment, not barred by a previous recovery."
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.-If a person continues a nuisance after
it has been adjudged to be wrongful and damages have been awarded
against him, the case is one for exemplary damages. Blackstone
ventured this opinion in the absence of authority (3 Bl. Com. 220),
saying "Indeed overy continuance of a nuisance is held to be a
fresh one (2 Leon. pl. 129, Oro. Eliz. 402), and therefore a fresh
action will lie, and very exemplary damages will probably be given,
if, after one verdict against him, the defendant has the hardiness to
continue it. "Since then this opinion has become law by the force
of repeated decisions. Deberry's Case, 1 Hayw. (N. Car.) 248 ;
Carruthers v. Tillman, 1 Id. 501; Clyde v. Clyde, 1 Yeates (Pa.)
92 ; Walker v. Butz, Id. 574 ; Mayor v. Com'rs, 7 Penn. St. 348,
866; Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 Id. 298. In Battishill v. Reed,
18 0. B. 696, JERViS, 0. J., said: "Every day that the defendant
continues the nuisance he renders himself liable to another action.
I think the jury did right to give as they generally do, nominal
damages only in the first action ; and, if the defendant persists in
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continuing the nuisance, then they may give such damages as may
compel him to abate it, but not as was insisted here, the difference
between the original value of the premises and their diminished
value."
For a decision authorizing punitive damages in case of injury to
land by unauthorized trespass and entry in the course of constructing
a railroad: See Anderson, &e., B d. v. Kernodle, 54 Ind. 314.
II. TREsPAss.-In case of trespass, the act complained of is a
direct injury in itself and the damages are merely consequential.
There is not a new wrong when new damages accrue, and therefore
no new cause of action. The plaintiff must therefore recover the
entire damages from a trespass in a single action: Kansas By. v.
.fiklman, 17 Kan. 224; Petter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 77; Oakley v.
.Kensington Canal Co., 5 B. & Aid. 138; Clegg v. Dearden,- 12
Q. B. 575; FTedder v. T'edder, 1 Den. 257; White v. Mosely, 8
Pick. 356; .Diccinson v. Boyle, 17 Id. 78; Williams v. Pomeroy
Coal Co., 37 Ohio St. 583 ; Dick v. Webster, 6. Wis. 481 ; Mar-
shall v. Uleswater Steam Navigation Co., L. R., 7 Q. B. 166.
This rule and the reasons therefor apply with added force to the
cases of trespasses causing permanent injury.
In Fetter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 11, where a plaintiff, who had reco-
vered in a former action for assault and battery, brought a fresh
action upon another piece of his skull coming out, Lord HOLT
compressed the rule, the distinction and the reason into an opinion
of but one sentence, which has become classic. He said, "Every
new dropping is a new nuisance, but here is not a new battery, and
in trespass the grievousness or consequence of the battery is not the
ground of the action, but the measure of damages, which the jury
must be supposed to have considered at the trial."
In Kansas By. v. lihilman, 17 Kan. 224, the defendant had
entered upon the plaintiff's land and dug a trench thereon, diverting
waters from theii, natural channel and causing them to overflow the
plaintiff's land. It was held that the trespass itself constituted the
invasion of the plaintiff's rights, and that the cause of action was
complete. BREWER, J., said: "So far as the company had acted,
its action was finished when it had dug the ditches (we are now
considering the question with reference solely to what it did off its
own land, and upon that of Mihlman). It had invaded Mihliman's
rights; it had committed a trespass on his lands. It was then
responsible in an action for the injury it had done by that trespass.
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Such action might have been brought immediately, and in such
action could have been recovered all damages done to Mihlman by
the trespass, and which might have included the cost of restoring
the ground to the condition it was before the digging of the ditches.
What new act has the company since done? What wrong has it
done to Mihlman's property ? Nothing. Its hands have been still.
It has made no new invasion of his rights. * * * Suppose an action
had been brought and damages recovered for the trespass immedi-
ately after it accrued; what new act of the company could now be
alleged as the basis of the recovery ? True the trespass has now re-
sulted in greater loss than was then foreseen or estimated in assess-
ment of damages; but an increase in the damages resulting adds no
new cause of action." After stating Fetter v. Beale, cited above,
and citing other cases, he proceeds, "so far the trespass, the
cause of action is complete at the time, and an increase in the
resulting damages gives no new cause of action. There are cases
it is true in which the cause of action is based upon the actual
occurrence of damages and dates therefrom, and not upon or from
the prior act which resulted in the damage; but these are all cases
in which the prior act is itself lawful, and furnishes no cause of
action, or where it is considered as a continuing act; as, where one
excavates on his own land, and thereby withdraws the lateral sup-
port to his neighbor's soil and buildings, the act is itself lawful,
and only becomes the basis of a cause of action for damages when
it actially results in injury: and the cause of action dates not from
the time of the excavation, but from the time of the subsidence.
Bonomi v. Backhouse, 96 Eng. Oom. L. 653. Here no trespass is
committed. The party is simply using his own property, and using
it lawfully; and it is only when he conflicts with the rule, sic itere
tuo ut alienum non kedas, that his neighbor has any cause of com-
plaint. * * * Other cases might be cited, but enough have been to
show the principle which underlies them, namely-, that where the
original act itself is no invasion of the plaintiff's rights, then there
is no cause of action until such act has caused damage, and the
right of action dates from that time. On the other hand, as we
have already stated, where the original act is unlawful, and an inva-
sion of the plaintiff's rights, the cause of action dates from that act,
and a new cause of action does not arise from new damage resulting
therefrom. The case of Lord Oakley v. Kensington (anal Co., 5
Barn. & Ald. 188, is strongly in point. The canal company entered
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upon plaintiff's land and dug it away for the purpose of stopping
the banks of their canal, in consequence of which the land was
overflowed at every high-tide. It was held that the injury was
complete when the trespass was committed, and that no new cause
of action arose with every overflow. So in the case of Clegg v.
Dearden, 12 Q. B. 575, the defendant made an excavation into the
mine of plaintiff, through which water flowed into the mine. It
was held that the cause of action was complete at the time the exca-
vation was made. Lord DENMAN, in giving the opinion of the
court, says: "The gist of the action, as stated in the declaration, is
the keeping open and unfilled an aperture and excavation made
by the defendant into the plaintiff's mine. By the custom the
defendant was entitled to excavate up to the boundary of his mine,
without having any barrier, and the cause of action therefore is,
the not filling up the excavation made by him on the plaintiff's side
of the boundary and within their mine. It is not, as in the case
of Holmes v. Wilson, 10 A. & E. 503, a continuing of something
wrongfully placed by the defendant upon the premises of the plain-
tiff: nor is it a continuing of something placed upon the land of a
third person to the nuisance of the plaintiff, as in the case of Tiomp-
son v. Gibson, 7 M. & W. 456. There is a legal obligation to dis-
continue a trespass, or remove a nuisance; but no such obligation
upon a tiespasser to replace what he has pulled down or destroyed
upon the land of another, though he is liable in an action of tres-
pass to compensate in damages for the loss sustained. The defend-
ant having made an excavation and aperture in the plaintiff's land,
was liable to an action of trespass ; but no cause of action arises
from his omitting to re-enter the plaintiff's land and fill up the exca-
vation. Such an omission is neither a continuation of a trespass
nor a nuisance ; nor is it a breach of any legal duty."
In Vedder v. F'edder, 1 Denio 257, the distinction is also
clearly stated. The defendant trespassed upon the land of the
plaintiff, and polluted his stream by placing foul matter therein.
The plaintiff afterwards gave him, for a valuable consideration, a
discharge and satisfaction "of all demands to date." It was held,
that such discharge extinguished all right of action, not only for the
original injury and the damages up to that time, but for all future
damages occasioned by the nuisance. The court say : "If the nui-
sance had been placed on the defendant's land, at the head of the
stream, so as thereby to have proved equally injurious to the plain-
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tiff, an accord and satisfaction, or a release of all demands to the 1st
of June, would not have barred an action for the continuance of the
nuisance after that day. Every succeeding injury a ter that time,
would have been a new and distinct cause of action. But that is
plainly distinguishable from this case."
So in Mitchell v. Darley Alain Colliery Co., 14 Q. B. Div. 125,
which was for withdrawal of lateral support, counsel urged upon the
court Marshall v. Ulleewater Steam Navigation Co., L. R., 7 Q. B.
166. BowEN, L. J., remarked: " That was an action of trespass,
it does not apply to this case."
I am aware that this distinction was expressly denied in the case
of Chicago & -Eastern Illinois Rd. v. Loeb, 8 N. E. R. (Ill.) 460.
But in that case the court were misled by confusing the distinction
between trespass and case as actions with trespass and nuisance as
torts. SHELDON, J., said: "The distinction which appellee's coun-
sel draws in that case, that it was one of trespass, some piles in the
protection of the bridge having been actually driven in Maher's
land ((. & A. Rd. v. Mdaher, 91 Ill. 312), does not make a satis-
factory discrimination. There is no significance in that action
having been one of trespass and not case, as our statute has abol-
ished all distinctions between the actions of trespass and trespass on
the case."
The distinction insisted on is not one of forms of action. It is
the fundamental distinction of fact between damages produced by
one cause at one time, and by many causes at many times. The
case illustrates the very common failure to distinguish between sub-
stantive law and remedial law, between substantive law and adjec-
tive law. The legislature have abolished the separate forms of
remedy, the court infers that the distinction between different kinds
of wrongs is also abolished.
IV. TRESPASSES CAUSING CONTINUING NUISANCES, OR CON-
TINUING TRESPASSES.-Here the rule is modified to conform to
'that for continuing nuisances. Each continuance is treated as a
fresh wrong which will support a fresh action, and accordingly dam-
ages are limited to those accrued prior to suit for which there has
been no previous recovery: Holmes v. Wilson, 10 A. & E. 503;
Sergeant Williams in I Wins. Saund. 23, note 1, to Manchester v.
Vale; Monckton v. Pashley, 2 Ld. Raym. 976 ; Bowyer v. Cook,
4 C. B. 236; Battishill v. Reed, 18 C. B. 696; Cumberland
Canal Co. v. Hitehings, 65 Me. 140; Russell v. Brown, 63 Id.
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203 ; Esty v. Baker, 48 Id. 495 ; Savannah Canal 0o. v. Bour-
quin, 51 Ga. 378. In this last case the rule is so stated in a dictum,
the case being actually one of overflowing plaintiff's lands by reason
of the defendant's negligence.
The rule is modified, I have said, in this particular. All the
consequences of the continuing trespass flow from the original in-
vasion of the plaintiff's right, and if that alone were considered all
the damages should be recovered in one action. But that wrongful
act has another characteristic, viz., it creates a continuing nuisance.
In Holmes v. Wilson, buttresses for a road were thrown out upon
the plaintiff's land. In Battishill v. Beed, eaves -were projected
over the plaintiff's land. Similar to that case, all cases of trespass
and nuisance by projection of eaves are Bolfe v. Rolfe, T. Moore
353; Beswick v. Combdon, Id.; s. a. cited in Penruddok's Case,
5 Co. Rep. 205 ; Fay v. Prentice, 1 0. B. 828 ; Codman v. Evans,
7 Allen 431 ; Whitney v. Sanders, 3 Pitts. 226 ; Gould v. Mc-
Kenna, 86 Penn. St. 297; Aiken v. Benedict, 39 Barb. 400 (over-
ruling Sherny v. .Frecking, 4 Duer 452, which held that ejeetment
was the remedy).
In Bowyer v. Cook, 4 0. B. 236, the injury was by placing
stumps and stakes on plaintiff's land and leaving them there. In
Canal Co. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140, the action was trespass for
filling up and maintaining the filling in a canal.
The character of the wrongs as presenting the features of both
trespass and nuisance is evident. Sergeant Williams, in the note
above cited (1 Wins. Saund. 23, n. 1, to lanchester v. Vale), lays
down the rule strongly : " The continuing of a trespass from day
to day is considered in law a several trespass on each day, and must
be directly and positively answered by the defendant, as 'well as
the original trespass."
In Holmes v. Wilson, the plaintiff had recovered damages for the
erection of the buttresses in a former suit, and now brought an
action of trespass for the wrongful continuance; Lord DmNMAN,
C. J., said: "The former and the present actions are for different
trespasses. The former was for erecting the buttresses. This action
is for continuing the buttresses so erected. The continued use of
the buttresses for the support of the road, under such circumstances,
was a fresh trespass."
In Canal Co. v. Hitehings, 65 Me. 140, the court said: "When
something has been unlawfully placed upon the land of another
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which can and ought to be removed, then, inasmuch as successive
actions may be maintained, until the wrongdoer is compelled to
remove it, the damages in such suit must be limited to the past and
cannot embrace the future."
But this rule was not established without objection. In the case
of Farmers of Hampstead Water, 12 Mod. 519, it is stated in the
report, "upon executing a writ of inquiry of damages in trespass
for digging a hole in the plaintiff's soil, whereby his land was over-
flown, continuando transgressionem, for nine months, and it was
insisted that they might give evidence after the nine months, as
well as in a nuisance which continues for nine months, and the
cause is removed, if the effect continues afterwards" damage may
be recovered for it; but Lord HOLT, 0. J., said: "he was not
satisfied that the parity should hold, for the gist of the action in a
nuisance is the damage; and, therefore, as long as there are dam-
ages there is ground for an action, but trespass is one entire act,
and the very tort is the gist of the action ; and, therefore, he said
he doubted whether an action would lie for the continuance of a
trespass, as for that of a nuisance." Judge BREWER also objected
to this phase of the rule in Kansas B y. v. lihIman, 17 Kan. 224.
"At any rate," he said, "we do not think it can be extended beyond
the character of trespasses there named, that is, those in which
something is carried to and placed upon the land." Here he is
indefinitely describing the class to which the rule does apply. The
description trespasses which create continuing nuisances, definitively
determines the class, and harmonizes the rule. The series of torts
bearing this two-fold character is treated according to its leading
characteristic and placed with continuing nuisances as proper
ground for successive actions with recoveries limited to damages
already accrued. This classification has not been fully reasoned
out by the courts, but the limitations upon the rule are such as to
enable us to delineate the class.
MERRITT STARR.
Chicago. .(To be continued.)
